Regan on respect and doing harm

Tom Regan's book The Case for Animal Rights is 400 pages of closely reasoned argument. A synopsis can be found in the article "The Case for Animal Rights" (see column at left). Regan argues that the criterion for having the right to be treated with respect is being the subject-of-a-life. What is that?

To be the subject-of-a-life, in the sense in which this expression will be used, involves more than merely being alive and more than merely being conscious. ...individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests. (p. 243)

The right to be treated with respect implies the prima facie right not to be harmed by moral agents. But sometimes rights conflict and someone's right not to be harmed must be overridden. Apart from the obvious cases of acting in self-defence and punishing the guilty, Regan proposes two main principles for deciding cases of conflicting rights.

The miniride (minimize overriding) principle:

Special considerations aside, when we must choose between overriding the rights of many who are innocent or the rights of few who are innocent, and when each affected individual will be harmed in a prima facie comparable way, then we ought to choose to override the rights of the few in preference to overriding the rights of the many. (p. 305)

The worse-off principle:

Special considerations aside, when we must decide to override the rights of the many or the rights of the few who are innocent, and when the harm faced by the few would make them worse-off than any of the many would be if any other option were chosen, then we ought to override the rights of the many. (p. 308)